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NOTES
THE LOCATION DECISIONS OF FOREIGN INVESTORS IN CHINA: UNTANGLING THE EFFECT OF
WAGES USING A CONTROL FUNCTION APPROACH
Xuepeng Liu, Mary E. Lovely, and Jan Ondrich
Abstract—There is almost no support for the proposition that capital is
attracted to low wages from firm-level studies. We examine the location
choices of 2,884 firms investing in China between 1993 and 1996 to offer
two main contributions. First, we find that the location of labor-intensive
activities is highly elastic to provincial wage differences. Generally,
investors’ wage sensitivity declines as the skill intensity of the industry
increases. Second, we find that unobserved location-specific attributes
exert a downward bias on estimated wage sensitivity. Using a control
function approach, we estimate a downward bias of 50% to 90% in wage
coefficients estimated with standard techniques.

I.

Introduction

C

OMPETITION for capital in labor-intensive activities with low
entry barriers occurs largely among and within developing countries. This paper uses the location choices of foreign investors in
China to estimate the response of capital to regional wage differentials. China is conducive to such a study because large capital inflows
have been attracted in part by low wages and because there are
substantial intracountry wage differences. During the period of substantial Chinese liberalization, 1992 to 1996, foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) contributed 32% of fixed asset investment by all nonstate
firms and over half of Chinese manufactured exports.1 During the
same period, average real wages of Chinese industrial workers rose
7.2%.2 There was substantial variation in wage growth across provinces: real wages rose an average of 12.6% in Beijing but by only
0.7% in Hainan. Some observers claim that local governments prevented further wage gains in an effort to maintain flows of foreign
capital.3
Despite the importance of foreign capital to developing economies,
our understanding of the extent to which investors are attracted to
low-wage locations is surprisingly incomplete. Studies of aggregate
investment flows provide consistent evidence that capital is attracted
to low wages, but there is little support for this proposition from
studies that use microdata. Such data are prized because aggregate
data often are not rich enough to explore key questions such as how
production technology influences firms’ wage sensitivity.
This study offers two main contributions. First, using information
on 2,884 manufacturing equity joint ventures (EJV) in China between
1993 and 1996, we find that low-wage locations are more attractive to
unskilled-labor-intensive activities than to skill-intensive activities.
These results suggest that rising wages most strongly influence invesReceived for publication October 4, 2006. Revision accepted for publication April 9, 2008.
Liu: Kennesaw State University; Lovely: Syracuse University; Ondrich:
Syracuse University.
We have benefited from discussions with Amil Petrin and Ken Train. We
acknowledge helpful suggestions from Lee Branstetter, Judith Dean,
Devashish Mitra, and seminar participants at the NBER China Working
Group and the University of Nottingham. We are grateful to Gary
Jefferson for providing Chinese industrial factor intensities.
1 Investment percentage calculated by authors from Huang (2003, table
1.1). Export share taken from Huang (2003).
2 Percentage calculated by authors based on the wage data from Branstetter and Feenstra (2002).
3 Ross and Chan (2002) forcefully articulate this view. Bhagwati (2004)
provides a response.

tors engaged in the least complex production activities. Second, we
use a control function approach to conditional logit analysis discussed
in Petrin and Train (2005) and estimate a downward bias of 50% to
90% in the wage coefficients estimated with standard techniques.
Overall, firms are more responsive to wages than previous estimates
indicate.
II.

Wages, Firm Location Choice, and Omitted Variable Bias

Because the literature on FDI flows is large, our review of previous
studies of wages and firm location choice is necessarily targeted. From
all studies using aggregate FDI flows, we discuss only results obtained
in studies of investment into Chinese provinces.4 Among project-level
studies, we examine results using data from foreign investment into
the United States, the EU, and China. These regions receive the largest
shares of foreign investment and permit study of location choice in the
context of centralized labor market regulation.
Recent studies of the distribution of aggregate FDI flows among
Chinese provinces or regions include Coughlin and Segev (2000), Wei
et al., (1999), Cheng and Kwan (2000), Fung, Iizaka, and Parker
(2002), Gao (2002), and Fung, Iizaka, and Siu (2003). In all these
studies, wages are found to be a statistically significant, negative
determinant of the value of FDI flowing into a Chinese province or
region. This result is robust to the choice of method and the inclusion
of controls for skill level or skill availability.5 Thus, aggregate studies
strongly support the view that firms seek locations with low wages,
ceteris paribus.
Given the uniformity of results from aggregate flows, it is surprising that studies using microdata do not typically find wages to be a
significant determinant of location choice. An insignificant wage
coefficient has been estimated in studies using foreign plant locations
in the United States (Ondrich & Wasylenko, 1993; Head, Ries, &
Swenson, 1999; List & Co, 2000; Keller & Levinson, 2002), Europe
(Devereux & Griffith, 1998; Head & Mayer, 2004), and China (Head
& Ries, 1996). Indeed, in some specifications, the estimated wage
coefficient is positive.6 One possible explanation for these results may
be that foreign investors invest in these locations for market access
rather than cost reductions. However, within a common market, such
as the United States or Europe, there remains a presumption that
higher wages should influence the state or region that investors
choose. Thus, the inability to estimate a significant, negative wage
coefficient frustrates many researchers.
A common concern in location choice studies is the possibility that
wages and unobserved location characteristics are not independent, so
that standard econometric techniques that require exogenous covariates produce biased estimates. As exposited by Berry (1994) to
explain low estimated price elasticities in differentiated product stud4 We also note studies that use cross-country variation in wages, such as
Wheeler and Mody (1992) and Wei (2000).
5 The only study that does not find a significant coefficient for wage, Gao
(2002), divides the value of investment among fourteen source countries.
6 A recent exception to this pattern is Amiti and Javorcik (2008), who
relate changes in the number of foreign-invested firms in Chinese provinces to changes in the average wage.
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ies, sellers typically receive higher prices when their product has more
desirable omitted characteristics.7 When this logic is applied to the
FDI context, omitted location characteristics that influence productivity may lead to biased estimates of the wage sensitivity of investors.
If the unobserved factors are otherwise mean independent of observed
factors, there is unambiguously a downward bias in standard estimates: firms look less sensitive to the wage than they really are.
The need to control for unobserved location-specific attributes is
widely recognized in studies using repeated cross-sections. One approach to spatially correlated errors is to estimate a nested logit model
(e.g., Head & Mayer, 2004).8 A second approach, which is used in
both conditional logit estimation and count data methods, is to control
for time-invariant unobserved spatial characteristics with fixed effects
(e.g., Head & Mayer, 2004; Keller & Levinson, 2002).9 All of the
studies listed include spatial fixed effects or use a nested logit
procedure yet still find that the wage is not a significant determinant
of location choice.
It is difficult to control for unobserved location-specific attributes
for several reasons. First, there may be insufficient variation over time
or too many empty cells to use fixed effects defined over the same
geographic unit as the choice set. For this reason, Keller and Levinson
(2002), in their study of foreign factory openings in U.S. states; Head
and Mayer (2004), in their study of Japanese factory openings in
regions within European countries; and Head and Ries (1996), in their
study of FIE locations in Chinese provinces, use fixed effects defined
over a geographic area larger than the unit of location choice.10
A second reason that it is difficult to control for unobserved
location-specific attributes is that these unobservables may vary with
time. This concern is particularly relevant in the Chinese case, where
liberalization advanced at a varied pace, beginning in the coastal
provinces but then pushing westward and increasing in speed, causing
the productivity of local factors to change over time. For example, in
1992, the Chinese government significantly liberalized its FDI regime
and decentralized approval from the central government to local
governments (Huang, 2003). How quickly this regulatory change
resulted in a liberalized investment environment varied from province
to province. One way to capture such time-varying unobservables is to
introduce time-province fixed effects to the conditional logit. This
approach typically is problematic, however, as it would introduce
more than 100 additional parameters to the estimation.
As an alternative, Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) offer the
product-market control approach, which has been widely used in
estimating differentiated product models. It involves estimation of a
set of controls that match observed to predicted market shares. Petrin
and Train (2006) identify a number of advantages of this approach but
note that unless sampling error in the market shares is minimal, this
estimator is not consistent and is not asymptotically normal. Because
the sampling error is unknown for the data we employ in this study,
we choose not to use the product-market control method.
7

Petrin and Train (2006) provide many examples from studies of
differentiated product models, including the well-known study by Berry et
al. (1995).
8 Discussion of the application of these methods to modeling firm
location decisions can be found in Ondrich and Wasylenko (1993).
9 As Head et al. (1999) note, this provides a convenient way to capture
common attributes. Many studies observe fewer than 1,000 investments,
and there are few observations in many year-location cells. Consequently,
parsimony is necessary.
10 Keller and Levinson (2002) control for time-invariant state characteristics in their analysis of the value of foreign-owned gross property, plant,
and equipment but are limited to the use of regional fixed effects in their
analysis of planned new foreign-owned factory openings.
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Another method for estimation of conditional logit models is
proposed by Petrin (2005) and Petrin and Train (2005, 2006) based on
control functions. A control function is a term added to an econometric
specification to capture the effect of unobserved local characteristics,
thereby breaking the correlation of the wage with the error term of the
location-specific profit function. James Heckman (1976, 1979) pioneered the use of control functions to correct selectivity bias in normal
linear regression models. The approach was used in the analysis of the
Tobit model by Smith and Blundell (1986) and of the binary probit
model by Rivers and Vuong (1988).
Typically the control function approach uses a two-step estimation.
In the first step, OLS regression is used to estimate the variables that
enter the control function. In our application, this first step requires the
construction of an expected wage for each province in each year, with
the residual used to specify a control function. In the second step, the
likelihood function is maximized with the control function as additional explanatory variables. We find substantial differences between
uncorrected estimates and those derived using the control function
approach.11
III.
A.

The Location Choice Model

The Profit Function

We use a familiar model in which a firm chooses to locate where
profits are maximized.12 A multinational firm seeks to invest somewhere in China. The firm produces with a generalized Cobb-Douglas
technology, using variable inputs of labor, imported inputs, and a
vector of locally provided services. Log profits for firm i in province
j can be written as
ln ij ⫽ ␣ ⫹ ln共1 ⫺ j 兲 ⫺ L ln wj ⫺ m ln pmj ⫺ S ln pSj ⫺ eij , (1)
where  k denotes a cost share,  j reflects the tax rate on foreign
investment in province j, w j is the wage, p mj is the price of imported
inputs, p sj is a price index for locally provided inputs, and e ij is an
idiosyncratic cost shock. The intercept, ␣, contains all terms that do
not vary by province. Our empirical concern is with the estimation of
the coefficient on the provincial wage, which depends on  L , the labor
cost share. It is clear from equation (1) that the effect on profits of a
higher wage is larger for firms in labor-intensive industries.
B.

Benchmark Estimating Strategy

Our basic estimating strategy is similar to conditional logit procedures in previous studies. We treat these conditional logit results as a
benchmark for comparison to results obtained using the control
function method. The profit function (1) yields a linear function for
log profits with arguments given by the vector
X ⫽ 关ln共1 ⫺ 兲, ln w, ln pm , ln pS 兴.

(2)

Using (1), we obtain ⌸ ⫽ X␤ ⫹ e, where ␤ is the vector of
parameters to be estimated. Our estimation strategy depends on the
distribution of the unobserved idiosyncratic terms, e ij . If these features
are distributed independently according to an extreme value distribution,
11 Petrin and Train (2006) find that estimated elasticities are similar
across the control function and product-market approaches, but they both
differ significantly from the uncorrected estimates.
12 We condition on the decision to produce in China. We also use a static
model of the investment decision, as is common in the literature.
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then the probability, Pk, that province k is chosen, where k is a member
of choice set J, is given by
Pk ⫽

exp共xk ␤兲
.
¥j僆J exp共xj ␤兲

(3)

This conditional logit is well suited to the location choice problem
since it exploits information on alternatives, accounts for matchspecific details, and allows multiple alternatives.
C.

Control Function Approach

The possible endogeneity of the wage in estimation of (1) can be
illustrated by specifying the error in the profit function as a twocomponent error:13
e ij ⫽ ␤   j ⫹ ε ij ,

(4)

where  j is location specific, observed by workers and firms but not by
the researcher. ε ij is an idiosyncratic error, assumed to be independent
across firms and locations. Defining Xj as in (2) and letting Z j be a
variable not in Xj , under certain regularity conditions the log wage can
be expressed as an implicit function of all factors taken as given at the
time of the decision:
ln wj ⫽ ln wj 共Xj , Zj , j 兲.

(5)

Because wages will be higher in locations with more desirable omitted
characteristics, e ij and ln w j will be correlated even after conditioning
on Xj , violating the weak-exogeneity requirement for conditional logit
covariates and leading to inconsistent parameter estimates.
Petrin and Train (2005, 2006) illustrate how a control function can
be used to test for and correct the omitted variables problem. The
method proceeds in two steps. The first step is a linear regression of
log wages (ln w j ) on exogenous variables Xj and Z j using provinciallevel data across years. We use this regression to construct the
expected wage for each province in each year. The residual is used to
estimate the control function, f( j , ), where  j is the disturbance
from the first-stage regression and  is a vector of estimated parameters. The profit function for firm i locating in province j can now be
written as
ln ij ⫽ ␣ ⫹ Xij ␤ ⫹ f 共j , 兲 ⫹ 共␤ j ⫺ f 共j , 兲兲 ⫹ εij .

(6)

The new error,  ij ⫽ ␤   j ⫺ f( j , ) ⫹ ε ij , includes the difference
between the actual province-specific error ␤   j and the control function, plus the idiosyncratic error.
Therefore, we assume that at location j, the log wage, ln w j , can be
expressed as
ln wj ⫽ E共ln wj 兩Xj , Zj 兲 ⫹ j 共j 兲,

(7)

where  j ( j ) is one-to-one in  j . Including f( j , ) in the conditional
logit specification holds constant the variation in the error term of the
location-specific profit function that is not independent of the wage.
The equation for ln w j above implies that 
ˆ j can be constructed as the
residual from a first-stage regression of ln w j on Xj and Z j . Because
the residual 
ˆ j replaces the disturbance  j in the control function
when estimation is performed, the usual standard errors are incorrect.
13 This discussion adapts the discussion of consumers’ choice among
differentiated products in Petrin and Train (2006) to the location choice
context.

As described in the appendix, we use bootstrapping methods to correct
the standard errors.
This approach requires a regressor for the first-stage wage regression that is correlated with the wage paid by EJVs but uncorrelated
with foreign firms’ location choices, conditional on other covariates.
Identifying a suitable choice requires characterization of the wagesetting process in China. As discussed in Chan (2003), although local
governments set minimum wages, private firms are otherwise free to
set wage levels. Given this, our first-stage regression is a reducedform wage equation with controls for labor supply (e.g., the share of
the labor force with secondary education) and for labor demand (e.g.,
the rate at which output of state-owned enterprises is falling).
We use the log of the average industrial wage paid by SOEs as Z j
in our first-stage regression. Both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and
EJVs hire labor that is relatively skilled. Our choice is valid if private
sector wages are influenced by some provincial characteristics that
drive multifactor productivity, while SOE wages are not. We rely on
the nature of the SOE wage-setting process and SOE productivitywage gaps to argue for the independence of SOE wages from unobserved factors that drive foreign-firm productivity. In China, SOE
wages prior to 1996 were largely determined by the central government, despite several rounds of wage reforms. Starting in 1985, the
Ministry of Labor (MOL) provided some profit-oriented incentives to
SOEs, but to a very limited extent.14 Deeper reforms of China’s SOE
wage structure were not implemented until the Ninth Five Year Plan
(1996–2000). Therefore, during the time frame of our sample, SOE
wages were largely set by central government guidelines and were
largely unresponsive to changes in private sector productivity.15

IV.

Data Description and Sources

The sample of equity joint venture investments was constructed by
Dean, Lovely, and Wang (2009), who provide details of the construction. The sample contains EJVs undertaken between 1993 and 1996
using project descriptions available from the Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC).16 We add
regional fixed effects to capture regional correlation in supply and
demand shocks. Complete descriptions and sources for all variables
are provided in table 1.
The wage measure is the average annual wage paid by private and
foreign enterprises in the province, drawn from Branstetter and
Feenstra (2002), who also provide the average annual wage paid by
SOEs, which we use in the first-stage wage regression. Average wages
do not control for provincial variation in labor quality, so we include
the share of the provincial labor force that has completed senior
secondary school or above.
14 For example, as Yueh (2004) showed, the State Council in 1992
permitted SOEs to set wages within the confines of a budget established
by the government. However, if a wage bill exceeded the MOL standard,
the enterprise paid a wage adjustment tax of 33%. Alternatively, the
enterprise could propose a wage budget and then submit it for approval.
15 Evidence from SOE productivity-wage gaps also supports the view
that SOE wages do not reflect local attributes that influence foreign firms’
productivity. Parker (1995) finds that “in 1992, state industrial wages were
43 percent higher than those available in urban collectives, and only 22
percent below those of the other ownership forms; these workers in other
ownership forms, however, were 130 percent (in 1990 prices) to 200
percent (in 1980 prices) more productive than those under stateownership.”
16 Equity joint ventures are limited liability companies incorporated in
China, in which foreign and Mainland Chinese investors hold equity. For
further details, see Fung (1997).
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TABLE 1.—DATA DEFINITIONS
Variable
EJV project
Location
Industry
SOE wage
Private wage
Agglomeration
Local firms
Population
Skilled labor ratio
Telephone density
Road density
Private market size
Change in state
ownership
SEZ or OCC
Capital stock
S&T Intensity

aDescriptive

AND

SOURCES

Definition

Source

Province
3-digit ISIC Rev. 2 classification
Average annual wage for industrial workers in stateowned enterprises, in 1990 yuan
Average annual wage for industrial workers in other
enterprises (private, foreign), in 1990 yuan
Cumulative value of real contracted FDI, from 1983
until t ⫺ 1, in millions of 1980 U.S. dollars
SOE and collective enterprises at the township level
and above
Province population, in millions
Share of population who have a senior secondary
school education level or above, in percentage
points
Number of urban telephone subscribers per million
persons
Road (km) per thousand km2 of land area
Real provincial GDP ⫻ (1 ⫺ SOE share), where SOE
share is the production share of SOEs; GDP is
value in billions of 1990 yuan
Difference in shares of industrial output from SOEs in
year t and t ⫺ 1
Dummy variable for a province with SEZ or open
coastal city
Capital stock, in 100 million 1978 yuan
Science and Technology expenditure as share of valueadded ⫻ 10, by ISIC 3-digit classification
(concordance by authors)

Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic Relations
and Trade, various years, Dean, Lovely, and
Wang (2009)
Branstetter and Feenstra (2002), from China
Statistical Yearbook, various years
Branstetter and Feenstra (2002), from China
Statistical Yearbook, various years
Coughlin and Segev (2000)

Meana

s.d.a

2,837

656

3,254

951

1,536

3,023

China Statistical Yearbook, various years, Dean,
Lovely, and Wang (2009)
China Statistical Yearbook, various years
China Statistical Yearbook, various years and
calculations by authors

16,061

10,871

41
12.08

27
6.19

China Statistical Yearbook, various years

29,266

29,382

China Statistical Yearbook, various years
China Statistical Yearbook, various years, and
calculations by authors

248
57

147
56

China Statistical Yearbook, various years, Dean,
Lovely, and Wang (2009)
Dean, Lovely, and Wang (2009)

⫺0.04

0.05

0.43

0.50

Kui-Wai Li (2003)
NBS Large and Medium Enterprise Survey,
1995, calculated by Gary Jefferson

1,784
0.50

1,610
0.30

statistics for provincial characteristics calculated from pooled data for 1993–1996 (excluding Tibet and Gansu).

We do not have direct measures of the cost of imported inputs ( p m )
or the corporate tax rate (). To control for provincial variation in
these factors, we include an incentive dummy that takes a value of 1
if there is a special economic zone (SEZ) or open coastal city (OCC)
in the province. We also include two measures of provincial infrastructure: length of roads adjusted for provincial size and number of
urban telephone subscribers relative to population.
To account for provincial variation in the price of local intermediate services ( p s ), we follow Head and Ries (1996) and include two
determinants of this price: the number of foreign firms and the number
of potential local suppliers.17 The number of foreign firms is measured
as the real value of cumulative FDI, which we refer to as agglomeration, for the period 1983 to the year before the project is undertaken.
Availability of potential suppliers of intermediate goods is measured
by the number of domestic enterprises at the township level and
above. To control for local market demand, we include population size
and provincial private GDP and its square. Sales may also be affected
by the extent to which a province is liberalizing, so we include the
change in the share of industrial output produced by SOEs.
V.

Results

Theory suggests that wages have a larger effect on profits in
labor-intensive industries, and so we expect these industries to be
more responsive to provincial variations in labor costs when choosing
an investment location. To allow for this differential response, we
17 Head and Ries (1996) develop a model of self-reinforcing FDI in
which the equilibrium number of intermediate suppliers depends on the
final-good price, the number of foreign firms to which domestic suppliers
may sell and the number of domestic firms that may undertake the costly
upgrading necessary to serve foreign firms.

characterize industries using Chinese industrial data on skill intensity,
expecting a more elastic response in industries that are less skill
intensive. Each industry’s skill intensity is based on data from the
Chinese National Bureau of Statistics’ Large-and-Medium Enterprise
(LME) Survey; it is calculated as total science and technology expenditures, including personnel, as a share of value added.18 We predict
that the estimated coefficient for the interaction of the private wage
and skill intensity will be positive: wage sensitivity should be lower
for more skill-intensive ventures.
A.

Standard Estimation Results

The first two panels of table 2 report results estimated using
standard techniques, without the inclusion of a control function. All
covariates are lagged one year. The overall fit of the equation is
comparable to other studies using similar procedures (e.g., Head &
Ries, 1996; Head & Mayer, 2004). All coefficients have their expected
signs, except provincial capital stock in the model without regional
fixed effects, and all are statistically significant.
For both specifications, we estimate a negative and highly significant coefficient for the private wage. In comparing results in the first
and second models, we see that the estimated value of the wage
coefficient drops by 35% when regional fixed effects are included.
Evidently controlling for time-invariant regional characteristics that
may be correlated with the wage reduces the estimated attraction of
low wages.
18 The LME survey is the most comprehensive firm-level data set
available for Chinese industrial firms. Access to the LME is restricted.
Results obtained using U.S. data to characterize skill intensity produce
similar results.
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TABLE 2.—CONDITIONAL LOGIT ANALYSIS

OF

EJV PROVINCIAL LOCATION

Without Control Function

Log private wage
Log wage ⫻ S&T intensity
Log agglomeration
Log local firms
Log population
Skilled labor ratio
Log telephone density
Log road density
Log private market size
Squared log private market
size
Change in state ownership
SEZ or OCC
Log capital stock
Regional fixed effects
Central
Coastal
Northeast
Northwest
Residual
Residual ⫻ S&T intensity
Number of observations
LR test
Log likelihood
Pseudo-R 2
Schwarz criterion
CF Wald statistic
(p-value)

With Control Function

Coefficient

s.e.

Coefficient

s.e.

Coefficient

s.e.

Coefficient

s.e.

⫺2.40***
1.04***
0.22***
0.82***
0.99***
0.09***
0.53***
0.41***
⫺1.85***

0.24
0.26
0.05
0.11
0.15
0.01
0.10
0.08
0.24

⫺1.55***
1.06***
0.33***
1.04***
1.97***
0.09***
0.49***
0.10
⫺3.13***

0.25
0.26
0.05
0.12
0.18
0.01
0.13
0.10
0.27

⫺3.75***
1.25***
0.35***
0.67***
0.79***
0.09***
0.61***
0.50***
⫺1.80***

0.50
0.30
0.07
0.14
0.18
0.01
0.12
0.09
0.26

⫺2.93***
1.33***
0.48***
0.95***
1.80***
0.07***
0.69***
0.11
⫺3.12***

0.57
0.30
0.08
0.13
0.22
0.01
0.17
0.11
0.30

0.21***
⫺2.91***
0.86***
⫺0.15***

0.02
0.78
0.10
0.06

0.16***
⫺6.06***
1.05***
0.41***

0.03
0.84
0.17
0.14

0.22***
⫺3.66***
0.72***
⫺0.24***

0.02
1.12
0.12
0.08

0.16***
⫺6.65***
0.88***
0.45***

0.03
1.12
0.19
0.15

1.42***
2.01***
0.69***
0.06

0.17
0.20
0.20
0.24

1.41***
1.96***
0.38
⫺0.10
2.79***
⫺1.62
2,884
3,542
⫺7,839
0.184
⫺7,915
9.38***
(0.009)

0.17
0.22
0.25
0.27
0.91
0.92

2,884
3,358
⫺7,931
0.175
⫺7,983

2,884
3,522
⫺7,849
0.183
⫺7,917

2.82***
0.85
⫺1.18
0.95
2,884
3,384
⫺7,918
0.176
⫺7,978
11.74***
(0.003)

Notes: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Variables are lagged by one year. Gansu and Tibet excluded.

In both models, the interaction of wage and industrial skill intensity
is positive and highly significant, as expected. The estimated coefficient for this interaction is very similar across the two models.
Because the maximum value of the skill intensity measure is 1.13,
either model suggests that higher wages make a province a less
attractive site for investment, ceteris paribus, for every industry.
However, the reduction in the wage coefficient caused by inclusion of
regional fixed effects, as in standard estimating strategy, leads to a
wage coefficient for firms with the mean level of skill intensity (0.54)
of ⫺0.98.
Coefficients for other covariates also change in value when regional fixed effects are added, but only the capital stock coefficient
changes sign. The regional coefficients indicate that EJVs are more
likely to locate in any region other than the Southwest, although the
difference is not significant for the Northwest region. As expected,
these coefficients are largest for the central and coastal zones, which
have the longest history of market liberalization.
B.

Control Function Results

The third and fourth models in table 2 provide results estimated
using the control function approach. Specifically, we include the
residual from the first-stage wage regression and the interaction of this
residual and industry skill intensity in the conditional logit estimation.
The third model omits regional fixed effects, while the fourth model
includes them. The reported standard errors (as well as variance
matrices used in the testing of joint hypotheses) are corrected using a
bootstrapping technique described in the appendix. The first-stage
regression explains 86% of the variation in the private wage, and the
coefficient of the log of the SOE wage is highly significant, with a

t-statistic of 8.76. Adding the log of the SOE wage to the first stage
explains an additional 5% of the variation in private wages.19
When the control function is added, the wage coefficient remains
negative and highly significant. However, it increases in absolute
value, providing an estimate of the downward bias in the standard
method. Comparing the first and third equations, those estimated
without regional effects, we find that the coefficient of ⫺3.75 estimated with the control function is 56% larger than the coefficient of
⫺2.40 estimated without the control function. Again, the coefficient
for the interaction of wage and industry skill intensity is highly
significant. This estimated coefficient is only slightly affected by
inclusion of the control function. The estimates obtained from the
third model indicate a wage coefficient of ⫺3.10 for firms with
average skill intensity.
When we include regional fixed effects as well as the control
function, the estimated coefficient is reduced somewhat, from ⫺3.75
to ⫺2.93 but remains larger than either model estimated without the
control function. Indeed, in comparison to the standard estimating
strategy using regional fixed effects, the wage coefficient is 89%
larger. Again we find that skill intensity significantly influences firms’
wage sensitivity. The wage response for all firms is negative, and the
estimated wage coefficient for firms with average skill intensity is
⫺2.21. Coefficient estimates on other variables are similar to those
estimated in the second model, with regional fixed effects only.
We use theoretical concerns, knowledge of the Chinese context,
and diagnostic statistics to set criteria for choosing a preferred spec19 First-stage wage regression results are available from the authors by
request. We include regional fixed effects in the wage regression when
they are included in the conditional logit.

NOTES
ification among these four models. From theory, we expect that
unobserved location advantages will be reflected in equilibrium
wages, leading us to suspect that omitted variables may be present in
the standard estimating strategy. From the Chinese context, we understand that liberalization proceeded rapidly but not uniformly between 1993 and 1996, implying that the investment environment in all
provinces evolved during the period.
For diagnostics, Petrin and Train (2006) suggest the use of a joint
significance test for the control function coefficients as a test of the
exogeneity of the log wage. In the two models estimated with the
control function, the values of the control function (CF) Wald statistic
reject exogeneity. We use the Schwarz criterion to assess which of the
four models performs best. The Schwarz criterion selects a model
from a set of proposed models of different dimensions by finding its
Bayes solution and evaluating the first terms of the asymptotic
expansion, which do not depend on the prior distribution. It penalizes
the log likelihood of each model by subtracting half of the product of
the number of parameters and log sample size. Heckman and Walker
(1987) include the Schwarz criterion in their set of criteria to choose
among competing duration models. Mills and Prasad (1992) find that
the Schwarz criterion consistently outperforms other model selection
criteria in a Monte Carlo analysis. In our case, the Schwarz criterion
favors the model in which both the control function and regional fixed
effects are included.
Based on these criteria, we use the model that includes the control
function and regional fixed effects to illustrate the varying response of
industries to wage differentials. For this purpose, we calculate the
elasticity with respect to the wage of the probability that a particular
province is chosen by a particular industry. This elasticity measure is
directly relevant to the policy concerns of local officials, who are
interested in the extent to which wage growth reduces the likelihood
that their province will be selected. As these elasticity calculations
depend on provincial characteristics, we illustrate our results using
Jiangsu, the province that received the largest number of projects in
our sample. We also calculate the associated standard error for this
estimate, using the delta method, and we test whether the elasticity
estimate is significantly different from unity.
Our estimates suggest that location choices of labor-intensive
industries are quite elastic with respect to wage increases. Foreigninvested enterprises account for a large share of export production in
these industries. The least skill-intensive industry, wood products, has
a skill measure of 0.17 and an estimated own-wage elasticity in
Jiangsu of ⫺2.15 (standard error of 0.32). The two industries that
accounted for the largest shares of Chinese exports in 1995 are also
highly sensitive to local wage differences: the estimated own-wage
elasticity for the textile industry is ⫺1.77 (0.38) and for apparel,
⫺2.12 (0.31). Footwear, another industry that accounts for a large
share of exports, also has a large own-wage elasticity: ⫺2.11 (0.31).
Each of these elasticities is significantly different from unity. In
comparison, the most skill-intensive industry, the manufacture of
professional, scientific, and controlling equipment, received little
foreign investment during this time period. This industry has a skill
measure of 1.13 and an estimated own-wage elasticity of ⫺1.13
(0.25). We cannot reject the hypothesis of unitary elasticity for this
industry or for other highly skill-intensive industries.
VI.

Conclusion

Previous microdata studies of firm location choice provide little
support for the standard theoretical prediction that firms are sensitive
to local wages in choosing a location for foreign investment. Using
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data from equity-joint-venture projects in China, we explore the
possibility that unobserved location-specific attributes exert a downward bias on estimates of investors’ response to wage differentials. We
introduce to the location-choice context a control function approach
applied by Petrin and Train (2005, 2006). Our results indicate that
standard conditional logit techniques underestimate the sensitivity of
investors to local wages and that coefficient estimates using the
control function are 50% to 90% larger in absolute value.
A second contribution of the paper is new evidence on the nature
of firms’ attraction to low wages. Firms’ responses to wages vary
systematically with the skill intensity of production. Investors in the
least skill-intensive industries exhibit the largest wage sensitivity in
choosing a host. Textiles, apparel, and footwear constituted large
shares of China’s overall manufacturing exports in 1995 and exhibited
highly elastic responses to local wage differences. In recent years,
exports of more skill-intensive products, such as office and computing
machinery and communications equipment, have grown rapidly. Our
results indicate that investors in skill-intensive industries are less
sensitive to local wages. Together these results suggest that wage
pressures on local hosts change as the development process matures.
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APPENDIX
First-Stage Results and Bootstrapping Procedures
A maintained primitive of the control function approach is that wages
are additively separable in the observed (Xj and Z j ) and the unobserved
factors ( j ); that is, the unobserved factors are mean independent of the
observed factors. This assumption implies uncorrelatedness of unobservables and covariates. It enables use of linear regression in the first stage
and ensures the consistent estimation of the residual from the first stage.
In the first stage, we regress log private wage on all variables in the
conditional logit and log SOE wage, as described in the text.
When a control function that includes predicted values is added to the
estimation, the coefficients are consistent, but the standard errors are
incorrect. Petrin and Train (2006) use bootstrapping to correct standard
errors in their applications. In the first stage, we bootstrap a wage sample
and regress the private wage on the exogenous variables and the log of the
SOE wage for the years 1990 to 1996.20 The control function in the second
stage is a function of the first-stage residual and the interactions of the
residual with industrial skill intensity. We run the conditional logit with
this control function and repeat this process 100 times. The variances of
these bootstrapped coefficients in the second stage are added to the
traditional variance estimates from the conditional logit regression with
the control function.21 We experiment with different orders of the polynomial of the residuals to specify the control function. Typically higher
orders are insignificant and have only a small effect; hence they are not
included in our regressions.

20 We do not use years after 1996 in the first stage to avoid possible
structural changes in wage structure after 1996 due to SOE reforms. We
also do not use years before 1990 for similar concerns. Years after 1989
and before 1993 are kept to increase the sample size and the reliability of
bootstrapping. However, the direction and magnitude of bias are consistent when we experiment with different years in the first stage.
21 Karaca-Mandic and Train (2003) propose alternative standard error
correction procedures, but find results very similar to bootstrapping.

TRADING ON TIME
Simeon Djankov, Caroline Freund, and Cong S. Pham*
Abstract—We determine how time delays affect trade, using newly collected
data on the days it takes to move standard cargo from the factory gate to the
ship in 98 countries. We estimate a difference gravity equation and find that
each additional day that a product is delayed prior to being shipped reduces
trade by more than 1%. Put differently, each day is equivalent to a country
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distancing itself from its trade partners by about 70 km on average. We also
find that delays have a relatively greater impact on exports of time-sensitive
goods, such as perishable agricultural products.
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